We study a boundedly rational model of imitation when payoff distributions of actions differ across types of individuals. Individuals observe others' actions and payoffs, and a comparison signal. One of two inefficiencies always arises: (i) uniform adoption, i.e., all individuals choose the action that is optimal for one type but sub-optimal for the other, or (ii) dual incomplete learning, i.e., only a fraction of each type chooses its optimal action. Which one occurs depends on the composition of the population and how critical the choice is for different types of individuals. In an application, we show that a monopolist serving a population of boundedly rational consumers cannot fully extract the surplus of high-valuation consumers, but can sell to consumers who do not value the good.
Introduction
We study decision-making when individuals have little information about the outcome of choosing among different actions. Although individuals may use information from their own experience, they may also use 1 In many situations, however, it is unlikely that the same choice yields similar outcomes to different individuals. For instance, if a farmer observes another farmer from a different geographic area, who obtains high profits after adopting hybrid maize, this may suggest that she should adopt hybrid maize as well. Yet, she may intuit that she might not reach such a high profit if her farm is located in a remote area with poor infrastructure, where obtaining hybrid seeds and fertilizers is much more costly. 2 The literature on boundedly rational learning and imitation has paid little attention to how individuals learn in the presence of heterogeneity. In particular, do all individuals converge to the same action or does each individual converge to her optimal choice? What factors determine the actions that are chosen in the long run? This paper offers answers to these and other related questions.
Our framework is similar to the setup of boundedly rational learning in social contexts (e.g., Fudenberg, 1993, 1995; Schlag 1998 ). Here individuals learn from their own and others' experiences in a process of repeated decision making. Hence, these models provide a natural environment for analyzing the implications of heterogeneity. We consider a population of individuals of two different, fixed and exogenously given, types (A and choice. In our example of the farmers above, the comparison signal originates from the information they may have about the difference in costs of obtaining seeds and fertilizer for hybrid maize. This information suggests to a remotely located farmer that she may not obtain as high profits as a farmer located in a geographic area with better infrastructure, if she follows him in adopting hybrid maize. Whenever an individual observes an action different from the one that she is currently using, she makes a new choice using a decision rule. The decision rule is a mapping from the payoffs obtained by herself and the observed individual, and the observed comparison signal, to the probability of switching to the action of the observed individual. We confine our analysis to a class of decision rules that are linear in observed payoffs and the comparison signal. We show (Proposition 1) that linearity and the unbiasedness of comparison signals combined yield payoff-ordering, i.e., on average, given that an individual observes the two actions, she is most likely to make the right choice.
3
Under homogeneity this property drives the whole population to choose optimally: optimal actions become popular and hence more likely to be sampled and chosen (see, e.g., Schlag 1998 ). Heterogeneity interferes with this implicit popularity weighting, leading to the inefficiencies discussed below.
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In our model learning is always incomplete: either (i) all individuals converge to make the same choice, which is optimal for one type but suboptimal for the other, or (ii) only a fraction of the populations of both types choose their optimal action. We refer to these two cases as uniform adoption and dual incomplete learning, respectively. Which one occurs is determined by two factors: (i) each type's size, i.e., the fraction of each type in the population and (ii) the sensitivity of each type's decision problem, i.e., each type's difference in expected payoffs across actions. Our main results (Lemma 1 and Theorem 1) characterize the long run inefficiency that arises (uniform adoption or dual incomplete learning) in terms of the sizes and sensitivities of each type. If one type is much larger or has a much more sensitive decision problem than the other, the whole population converges to choose that type's optimal action. On the other hand, a population that is relatively balanced in terms of sizes and sensitivities exhibits dual incomplete learning.
In our benchmark model, we assume uniform sampling, i.e., each individual samples each of the others with uniform probabilities. Our framework, however, can be tractably generalized to allow for biased sampling.
We consider both homophily and heterophily, i.e., bias toward sampling individuals of the same type and of a different type, respectively. 5 We show (Proposition 2) that the predictions are qualitatively similar to those obtained under uniform sampling. Furthermore, the more homophilous a type is, the greater their fraction that choose their optimal action and the smaller is the fraction of the other type that ends up choosing their optimal action.
We apply our results to a model where a rational monopolist, who has structural knowledge of the economy, faces boundedly rational consumers with heterogeneous valuations for her good. 6 The population is composed of two types of consumers: those whose expected valuation of the good is positive and those whose expected valuation is zero. We characterize the profit-maximizing price of the monopolist and show that bounded rationality leads to lower profits for the monopoly and a larger deadweight loss in comparison to full information.
The monopolist cannot charge a price that extracts all the consumer surplus from consumers with positive expected valuation. This would make their problem sensitivity equal to zero and all consumers would converge linear response to observed payoffs. 4 The inefficiencies caused by heterogeneity are not confined to payoff-ordering decision rules. Indeed, it can be shown that a decision rule would lead both populations to converge to choose their respective optimal actions only if the problem is "trivial", i.e., if for each individual, the revised probability of choosing her optimal action is one every time she observes both actions. 5 Homophilic tendencies are widely documented (see Currarini, Jackson and Pin 2009 and the references therein). The results of other extensions are discussed in section 6.
6 Models in which rational firms interact with boundedly rational consumers in the market have recently been studied, for instance, in Spiegler (2006) and (2011) Intensities and sampling. At time t 2 R + , every individual observes another individual whose state is 2 ⌃ with an intensity that, under the assumption of uniform sampling adopted here, corresponds exactly to the fraction of individuals in the state within the population at time t. Upon observing the action and payoff of the sampled individual and the comparison signal corresponding to the sampled individual's type, the individual reviews her choice using a decision rule that we now describe.
Decision rules. Individuals are boundedly rational and make choices according to a decision rule. As is common in the literature (e.g., Ellison and Fudenberg 1995, Cubitt and Sugden 1998), we assume that 5 individuals contemplate switching actions only when they observe an action different from the one that they are currently choosing. In this case, the probability of switching to the sampled action is determined by the decision rule (and otherwise individuals simply stick with their current action). Formally, the decision rule is a function that maps the observed payoffs and the comparison signal to the probability of switching to the other action when it is sampled. We denote this function by L, thus L :
is the probability that an individual switches, given that she obtained the payoff x, observed an individual who chose a different action and obtained the payoff y, and observed the comparison signal . Notice that the decision rule L is valid only when a different action is observed, and that = A if the sampled individual's type is A and = B if the sampled individual's type is B.
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In spite of their severe information restrictions, there are decision rules that allow individuals to be more likely to choose their optimal action every time they observe two different actions (and hence contemplate switching) -regardless of the specific payoff distributions or those of the comparison signals. We call this property payoff-ordering and show that only decision rules that are linear in observed payoffs and the comparison signal satisfy this property. Below, in Section 3, we assume that payoffs and comparison signals are independent from each other and across individuals, but for now we aim to define payoff-ordering in a more robust manner, without imposing independence. In particular we assume that the probability mass function of the join vector 
) is the expected value of the probability that a type ⌧ individual who chooses c and observes a type
for all ⌧, ⌧ 0 2 T and probability mass function µ 12 10 Given that we introduce comparison signals, calling our decision rule a model of imitation might be a bit controversial. We follow this convention because the most related models in the literature are usually called imitation models (see, e.g., Alos-Ferrer and Schlag 2009). 11 The assumption that the comparison signal is unbiased is still imposed here and throughout the paper, except in Appendix F, where we study the effect of abandoning it.
12 Since y + ⇤ . Here c = 2, but, for instance, the assumptions we make in the application of Section 5 yield a different value for c.
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The proof for the 'if' statement is instructive and is provided here. The argument for the 'only if' part is provided in Appendix A.
Proof. For any ⌧, ⌧ 0 2 T , and
. From now on, unless stated otherwise, we assume that decision rules are payoff-ordering. Since the comparison signal is unbiased, y + is an unbiased estimator of the expected payoff of individual i if she chooses the action of the sampled individual j. Therefore, y +
x is an unbiased estimator of the difference between the expected payoff of d and c for individual i. Hence, since > 0, in expected value, the probability of choosing the action that provides her the greatest expected payoff is greater than the probability of choosing the action that provides her the smallest expected payoff. Notice also that since 2 0,
Previous work on imitation in homogeneous populations focuses on either exogenously given rules or decision rules that have been shown to satisfy some desirable properties. For instance, Schlag (1998) studies improving rules, which satisfy that the population's average expected payoff is expected to be non-decreasing in time. It is easy to show that in our model, heterogeneity rules out this possibility. It would also be desirable for the decision rule to guarantee that individuals not only would be more likely to choose their optimal action, but also that they do so with high probability. Unfortunately, this is not possible in our model. Indeed, from the proof of Proposition 1 we have that for every decision rule, the expected value of the updated probability of choosing the action with the highest payoff of two observed actions is arbitrarily close to one half for some probability mass functions µ ⌧ c,⌧ 0 d . The expected probability of choosing the optimal action for any environment depends on the value of . This probability is maximized at = 1/4, yet the subsequent analysis is valid for all 2 (0, 1/4]. 13 It may seem unintuitive that a payoff-ordering decision rule prescribes switching with positive probability even if the observed action earned a lower perceived payoff than the own action. Changing this feature of the decision rule, however, would not allow payoff-ordering as the decision would necessarily have to be non-linear in observed payoffs and then the construction in the argument of sufficiency of the proof of Proposition 1 would not go through. To illustrate, consider an environment in which c gives a payoff of 0.1 to type A individuals with certainty, d gives a payoff of 0 with certainty for type B individuals and the comparison signal observed by type A individuals observing type B individuals choosing d is equal to 0 with probability 4/5 and 0.9 with probability 1/5. In this case ⇡ Ad > ⇡ Ac . Nevertheless, a decision rule that never switches if the observed action's perceived payoff is lower than the own would require a type A individual to stick with c with probability 4/5 when observing a type B individual 7 Finally, we notice that observing comparison signals allows individuals to make choices that, in expected value, do not depend on the observed individual's type and depend only on his choice. This result follows from the assumption that the comparison signal is unbiased; the formal argument for its proof follows directly from the proof of sufficiency in Proposition 1, and it is omitted.
Hence, for any payoff-ordering decision rule we define
Individual state update. As mentioned above, each individual reviews her choice at points in time determined by the intensities, i.e., the probability of sampling an individual of each state 2 ⌃. 14 
where d 6 = c. This assumption effectively imposes independence between an individual's payoff and the comparison signal she observes the next time she reviews her action.
Population dynamics
In this section we analyze the dynamics of choices when individuals choose according to a payoff-ordering 14 Similarly, the standard approach in the literature assumes that action revision times are determined according to an independent Poisson distribution. See, e.g., Sandholm (2010a Sandholm ( , 2010b , and Hofbauer and Sandholm (2011) for further details.
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Appendix B.
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The model proceeds in continuous time. Each individual reviews her choice at points in time according to the intensities and sampling procedures described in Section 2. Upon sampling, individuals update their state according to (1) . Our analysis is concerned with the fraction of type A individuals choosing a and the fraction of type B individuals choosing b. These fractions follow a stochastic process fully determined by the sampling and updating procedures described above. Since we assume a continuum population, our analysis focuses on the deterministic path corresponding to the expected value of the stochastic process. Let p(t) be the fraction of type A individuals choosing a and let q(t) be the fraction of type B individuals choosing b, for all t 0, along this path. If the fraction of individuals whose state is at time t is denoted by p (t) for all 2 ⌃ and t 2 R + , we have that
and
Let (⌃) be the set of all possible distributions of individual states at any point in time; that is, 
), for all ⌧ 2 T , ⌧ 0 2 T , c 2 S, and ⌧ 0 2 . The subset of (⌃) that satisfies all these restrictions is 15 There are measurability problems in invoking the law of large numbers for a continuum of random variables (see, e.g., Feldman and Gilles 1985, Judd 1985 , and Alos-Ferrer 2002). We thank Carlos Alos-Ferrer for pointing this out and providing us with these references. In the last decade, a number of papers deal with this issue and with independent random matching in particular, using Fubini Extensions introduced in Sun (2006) (see, e.g., Sun 2007, 2012) . See also Podczeck and Puzzello (2012) , who build on an earlier contribution by Alos-Ferrer (1999) to study independent random matching with a continuum of agents. We thank three anonymous referees for guiding us to this literature. In particular, as mentioned above, the foundations for the dynamical system analyzed here are an application of the results of Duffie, Qiao and Sun (2016) . In a related environment, with a different approach, Benaim and Weibull (2003) show that the deterministic path of dynamical systems yield a reasonable approximation of discrete time stochastic adjustment in large populations and over finite time horizons (see also Sandholm 2003 and Sandholm 2010a).
denoted byˆ (⌃).
Fix the initial fractions of the population in each individual state at (p (0)) 2⌃ 2ˆ (⌃). Then, the paths p(t) and q(t), are given by the solution of the system of differential equations
⌘ .
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The first term on the right-hand side of (4) gives the flow to action a of type A individuals. The mass of type A individuals choosing b and sampling someone choosing a is given by ↵(1 p) [↵p + (1 ↵)(1 q)] and the rate at which these individuals switch is given by L ba (A). Similarly, the second term on the right-hand side of (4) gives the flow to action b in the type A population. An analogous interpretation applies to (5).
We define p, q : R + ! [0, 1] as the solutions of (4)- (5) (with exogenously given initial conditions (p (0)) 2⌃ 2 (⌃)); most of the times, though, the time dependence of p(t) and q(t) will be omitted. Let U and D be the expected value of the probability of switching to their optimal action for type A and type B individuals,
. From the proof of sufficiency of Proposition 1, since the difference of expected payoffs across actions is contained in [ 1, 1] , we have U, D 2 (1/2, 3/4]. 17 Payoffordering decision rules satisfy L ab (⌧ ) = 1 L ba (⌧ ) for ⌧ 2 {A, B}, therefore the system of differential equations (4)-(5) can be written aṡ
In the sequel, it will often be convenient to work with the functionsṗ,q :
defined by the right hand sides of (6) and (7), respectively. Notice thatṗ(p, q) is decreasing in q. As q increases there are fewer type B individuals choosing a, therefore, when a type A individual samples a type B individual, the probability that this individual has chosen b is greater. This makes it more likely for type A individuals to choose b. The effect of p onṗ is ambiguous. In both heterogeneous and homogeneous populations,ṗ is a concave polynomial in p. In a homogeneous population, when p is very small there are too few type 16 As in most of the equations below, the time dependence of p and q have been omitted. 17 It may be thought that U and D being bounded away from 1 is a restrictive feature of the model. There is at least a couple of alternative ways to avoid this. First, the distribution of the comparison signal could be allowed to depend on the payoff realization in such a manner that y + x 2 [ 1, 1] . This would allow U, D 2 (1/2, 1]. Alternatively, as we discuss below, one could consider decision rules which are not payoff-ordering. The results of allowing U, D 2 (1/2, 1], however, are qualitatively similar to those of our benchmark case.
A individuals from whom to sample action a. On the other hand, when p is very large, just a few type A individuals are left to switch from b to a. In a homogeneous population, as long as p 2 (0, 1),ṗ > 0. This follows from the fact that, since U > 1/2, the flows from a to b are more than compensated by flows in the opposite direction. In a heterogeneous (non-isolated) population, however, p 2 (0, 1) is compatible withṗ < 0.
This occurs for high values of p at which an important fraction of type A individuals may be mislead when sampling type B individuals choosing b which may causeṗ < 0. An analogous reasoning applies toq and (7).
Long run results. Let the set of rest points of the system (6)- (7) be denoted by
First we characterize RP . When all individuals choose the same action the system is in a rest point. Hence, (0, 1) and (1, 0) are rest points and we refer to them as corner rest points. Our next result shows that for some values of ↵, U, and D there is a third rest point located in (0, 1)
2 . This interior rest point is given by
, and it exists if and only if
In the proof of this lemma we use the functions q :
Proof. If p = 1, thenṗ = 0 if and only if q = 0. Correspondingly, if q = 1, thenṗ = 0 if and only if p = 0.
Hence, (1, 0) and (0, 1) are rest points.
From (6) and (7), the points (p, q) that satisfyṗ =q = 0 are those that satisfy both
Notice that q(p) and p(q) are given by the right-hand side of (8) and (9), respectively, and hence, their graphs contain (0, 1) and (1, 0). The second derivative of q(p) is
where the numerator is strictly positive and the denominator is strictly negative, because p  1 < U/(2U 1); hence q is strictly concave. A similar calculation reveals that p is strictly concave as well. If (p, q) is a rest point of the system, then p = p(q(p)) and q = q(p) (or equivalently, q = q(p(q)) and p = p(q)). Hence, for (p, q) to be a rest point, p must satisfy We refer to corner rest points as uniform adoption and interior rest points as dual incomplete learning. Next we analyze the conditions for the different rest points to be stable. The notion of asymptotic stability that we study requires the system to remain close and converge to the rest point whenever the system starts sufficiently close to it (e.g., Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998). Formally a rest point (p
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In the following theorem, we characterize the stability properties of the different rest points of system (4)- (5) for virtually all possible parameter values. 19 Furthermore, we show that in each case, the asymptotically stable rest point is a global attractor, i.e., the system converges to this point regardless of the initial conditions (as long as the path does not start at a different rest point). The theorem shows that, if the fraction of type A individuals or the fraction of type B individuals is small enough, i.e., if ↵ < ↵ or ↵ > ↵, then we have convergence to uniform adoption. Otherwise, we have convergence to dual incomplete learning. As explained above, the cutoffs ↵ and ↵ are determined by the sensitivities of the decision problems of each type.
20
18 || · || stands for the Euclidean norm. 19 We only exclude ↵ = ↵ and ↵ = ↵, because the techniques that we use in the proof of the result applies only to hyperbolic rest points (see the proof of Theorem 1) and at ↵ = ↵ and ↵ = ↵ some of the rest points are not hyperbolic. 20 We cannot have complete learning for one type and partial learning for the other. E.g., we have no rest points (1, q) with q > 0. Intuitively, since type A individuals occasionally observe action b in this point and switch with positive probability when they do, they would move away from action a. Similarly, we have no rest points (p, 1) with p > 0.
Theorem 1 Suppose ↵ 6 = ↵ and ↵ 6 = ↵. Then, the system (6)- (7) has a unique asymptotically stable point given by
The proof of Theorem 1 is provided in Appendix C. Intuitively, since individuals make decisions according to a payoff ordering decision rule, in each decision they are more likely to choose their optimal action. The smaller the fraction of type A individuals in the population, however, the less likely it is to sample an individual choosing a. This leads action a to propagate less and eventually the whole population converges to choose b. Analogously, when the fraction of type A individuals in the population is large enough, a propagates more than b, and eventually, the whole population ends up choosing a. Finally, if the fraction of the population of type A is neither large enough nor small enough, both actions propagate in a more balanced manner and the system converges to an interior asymptotically stable rest point.
The fact that we do not have efficiency in the long run, i.e., that (p, q) does not converge to (1, 1) is a robust phenomenon that does not rely on the linearity of payoff-ordering decision rules. To see this, notice that for an arbitrary decision rule L, system (4)- (5) 
. Hence, unless switching to the sub-optimal action occurs with probability zero for both types, i.e., L ab (A, B) = L ba (B, A) = 0, the system cannot converge to (1, 1) if it starts elsewhere. The conditions L ab (A, B) = L ba (B, A) = 0 are fairly restrictive, however, as they require the decision maker never to switch in any event of realizations of observed payoffs and comparison signal, when she chose her optimal action.
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Dynamics of the system. We illustrate the dynamics of the system in the phase diagrams displayed in Figure 1 . The isoclines correspond to the graphs of the functions p and q. The left, center and right panels correspond to the cases ↵ < ↵, ↵ < ↵ < ↵, and ↵ < ↵, respectively. As illustrated in Figure 1 , the distinctive feature of each of these cases is that p is above q, p and q intersect, and p is below q, respectively. 21 Whenever a rest point is a global attractor, it satisfies the second condition of asymptotic stability. In general, however, it does not necessarily satisfy the first part, i.e., it is possible that the dynamics move away from the rest point before eventually converging to it. Nevertheless, Theorem 1 reveals that a rest point of (6)- (7) is asymptotically stable if and only if it is a global attractor of the system. 22 There are, however, examples of decision rules and environments such that these conditions are met. For instance, consider decision rules such as a suitably modified version of "imitate if better" (see, e.g., Oyarzun and Ruf 2009), in which individuals switch (corresp. do not switch) with probability 1 if y + > x (corresp. y + < x), and randomize with a fair coin, otherwise. This decision rule yields
, and the comparison signals within individuals of the same type (for all actions) are deterministic.
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)"-"4"-$#%&&: %-0 A 0/#+/%,/, )"-"4"-$#%&&:A "+ 9$#/ 9/+,%A %, !?# A" #"-9/+2/, 4" 4E/ %,:)*4"4$#%&&: ,4%I&/ +/,4 *"$-4G Let us provide some intuition for why we obtain such patterns in the dynamics of the system. For concreteness, we focus on the case in which both p(0) and q(0) are small and the population converge to choose b (the left panel of Figure 1 ). When both p and q are initially small, there is a large amount of individuals in each type that are subject to switch to their respective optimal action. Further, whenever an individual samples an individual from the opposite type she is likely to sample her own optimal action. Thus, initially learning occurs for both types of individuals in the sense that both p and q increase. In a homogeneous population imitation would continue and the whole population would converge to choose the unique optimal action. In our model, however, (p, q) eventually reaches a point above the isoclineṗ = 0 and when this happens p starts to decrease.
At this point the measure of type A individuals who are subject to switch to a and the measure of type B individuals from whom a can be sampled are both smaller than at the beginning, reversing the increase in p.
The decrease in p benefits type B, who become more likely to sample b from type A. This sets q on a positive trend, which in turn accelerates the decrease in p. The result is a dynamic in which the fraction of type A individuals choosing a decreases until it converges to zero, while the fraction of type B individuals choosing b converges monotonically to one. The analysis of the other cases is similar and is left for the reader.
The model predicts convergence to a corner rest point for a large set of parameter values. Therefore, in our model, when the sensitivities of the problems are relatively similar, imitation within a heterogeneous population may not result in optimality for minorities. This contrasts sharply with findings for homogeneous populations, where such adverse effects cannot arise (e.g., Fudenberg 1995, Schlag 1998 ). The adverse effect for the minority is related to the fact that its optimal action eventually becomes difficult to sample. The sampling procedure creates a bias toward actions that are more popular, in the sense that a larger fraction of the population is choosing them. This contrasts with the manner in which Ellison and Fudenberg (1993) introduce popularity, in which they assume that when individuals make choices, they are biased toward more popular actions. In our analysis, there is no exogenously imposed bias toward more popular actions. As in Ellison and Fudenberg (1995) , this bias instead arises endogenously as a result of the sampling procedure.
Comparative statics: the role of sensitivity and size. Here we analyze the impact of ↵, U , and D on the predictions of the model. Recall that U and D are determined by the difference in the expected payoff across actions for type A and type B individuals, respectively. Hence, the effect of U and D on the long run outcomes reflects the impact of the sensitivity of the decision problems. Abusing notation, let the functions
2 . An interior rest point exists whenever 
This implies that for small enough D (and for fixed ↵ and U ) the population converges to choose a, whereas for small enough U (and for fixed ↵ and D) the population converges to choose b. Hence, if the majority is close to indifferent between a and b, but the minority is not, the population converges to choose the minority's optimal action. On the other hand, since ↵(U, D), ↵(U, D) 2 (0, 1), for any U, D there exist some ↵ such that the population converge to choose either a or b. This means that even if, for example, type A individuals are close to indifferent between a and b, if type A is sufficiently large, the population converge to choose a.
Let (p(U, D, ↵),q(U, D, ↵)) be the interior rest point expressed as a function of the parameters of the model.
Hence, the fraction of type A individuals choosing their optimal action in an interior rest point increases in type A's sensitivity and size and decreases in type B's sensitivity.
In the interior rest point,ṗ(p, q) is decreasing in p. Asṗ(p, q) is increasing in U, when U increases, the isoclinė p(p, q) = 0 moves to the right which results in higher value of p in equilibrium. A similar argument reveals why b p is increasing in ↵ and decreasing in D.
Homogeneous sensitivities. It is instructive to look at the case where the sensitivity of the problems of both types of individuals is the same. In the special case U = D and ↵ = 1/2 we obtain b p = b q = U . Let us briefly look at why this is the case. If p = q = U , then the probability of sampling either action is equal to 1/2.
The flow towards a among type A individuals is therefore 
. Hence, ↵b p + (1 ↵)b q = U , so the total fraction of individuals in the population choosing their optimal action in the interior rest point is equal to the common sensitivity of both types. In the corner equilibria, however, when ↵ / 2 (1 U, U ), the fraction of the population choosing their optimal action is greater than U .
Non payoff-ordering decision rules. We now turn our attention to the impact of assuming that individuals follow payoff-ordering decision rules. Alternatively, we could consider decision rules such as the version of "imitate if better" described in footnote 22. It is easy to construct environments such that U, D 2 (3/4, 1) for this decision rule. This yields results qualitatively similar to those provided above. More possibilities arise when U and D can be less than 1/2, which can also occur in some environments for this decision rule.
If U  1/2 and D > 1/2, then the population converge to choose b for all ↵ 2 (0, 1), and hence, as with payoff-ordering decision rules, we obtain uniform adoption. A different result, however, can be obtained if both Average expected payoff of the population. If individuals were to randomize uniformly between the two actions, then, on average, half of the individuals of each type would choose their optimal action. We say that imitation is detrimental for a type of individuals whenever less than half of them choose their optimal action asymptotically. The imitation process is detrimental for one of the types when the asymptotically stable rest point is either (0, 1) or (1, 0). At an interior rest point, imitation is detrimental for at most one type: since q(0) = 1 and q(1) = 0, and q(p) is strictly concave, we have q(p) > 1 p for all p 2 (0, 1); therefore, p +q > 1. If there is a type for which imitation is detrimental, however, this type represents a small fraction of the population or has the decision problem with the smallest sensitivity. It turns out that the gains over random choice of the type that benefits from imitation always exceed the losses incurred by the type for whom imitation is detrimental, if any. The average expected payoff of the population in the state (p, q), denoted by
, is given by
The average expected payoff of the population when all individuals choose randomly with uniform probability, denoted by W RC , is given by (4)- (5).
; and this holds, because (a similar argument holds if
Biased sampling
In this section we allow for homophily (bias towards sampling same type individuals) and heterophily (bias towards sampling other type individuals). Homophilic tendencies are widely documented in the social networks literature (see Currarini, Jackson and Pin 2009 and references therein), and may be due to segregation or individuals' preferences for having friends that are similar to them.
We introduce homophily and heterophily in our model using the parameters ↵ A 2 (0, 1) and ↵ B 2 (0, 1), which correspond to the the relative intensities with which type A individuals sample a type A individual and type B individuals sample a type B individual, respectively. In the benchmark case analyzed above, Mass-balancing condition. Since our analysis requires that individuals sample each other, our model needs to satisfy the mass-balancing condition
for all (p 00 ) 00 2⌃ 2 (⌃) and , 0 2 ⌃. The mass-balancing condition is satisfied automatically in the benchmark model analyzed above, because there we assume that intensities are equal to the fraction of individuals in that individual state within the population; i.e., ✓ 0 ((p 00 ) 00 2⌃ ) = p 0 , for all (p 00 ) 00 2⌃ 2 (⌃) and , 0 2 ⌃. This binary variable represents a dummy-sampling type, which allows some individuals to sample without changing their actions (that is, these individuals are only observed by other individuals). Thus, by introducing dummy-sampling types, we are able to satisfy the mass-balancing condition while at the same time effectively generate biased sampling.
Individual states. We extend the definition of individual states including the binary variable ✏ 2 {0, 1};
thus, we now consider individual states : ) with probability 
Intensities. We set the intensities to
for all (p 00 ) 00 2⌃ 2 (⌃). Thus, the model satisfies the mass-balancing condition. The differential equations, analogous to (4)- (5), that drive the dynamical system in presence of homophily and/or heterophily are
In Subsection 10.1 of Appendix D we explain how to derive these differential equations. We now provide the analysis of the dynamics implied by this system.
Stable Equilibria. The resulting dynamics are qualitatively similar to the case of uniform sampling, yet the analysis allows us to obtain insights about the effect of these biases on the population's choices. As before, we obtain convergence to either a corner rest point or a unique interior rest point. We also obtain some results, however, that cannot arise under uniform sampling. The corner rest point that is non-optimal for a type of individuals can be ruled out if this type is sufficiently homophilous. More generally, the fraction of both types
. This means that a type benefits from being more homophilous and is affected negatively by the homophily of the other type. In the limit, as ↵ A and ↵ B go to one, so each type is completely homophilous, the global attractor of the system approaches (1, 1), i.e., the entire population makes the right choice. Hence, the limit of the model when ↵ A and ↵ B go to one corresponds to the case of two homogeneous populations.
Formally
, respectively, for all z 2 R. It is easy to see that
is the inverse function of ↵ B . The following lemma characterizes virtually all the pairs (↵ A , ↵ B ) such that (1, 0) is asymptotically stable and such that (0, 1) is asymptotically stable.
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Appendix D contains all proofs of this section. , then
is not asymptotically stable, and if D > U and
, then (0, 1) is asymptotically stable.
Lemma 2 implies that for any U, D 2 ( 25 The only possibilities we do not consider here are when
, in which case some rest points may not be hyperbolic and hence may not be determined using the Jacobian of the system. 
, then there is a unique interior rest point. Lemmas 2 and 3 establish that, setting aside the cases where rest points may not be hyperbolic, i.e., 
We shall emphasize two implications of the results above. First, together with Corollary 1, Proposition 2 implies that if a given type is sufficiently homophilous, then the population will not converge to choose that type's non-optimal action. For example, if
then the system will not converge to (1, 0) regardless of ↵ A and U . An implication is that if both types are sufficiently homophilous, then the population converges to an interior rest point. Second, if U > D and additionally type B is relatively small or heterophilous, so that ↵ B is below a threshold value (determined by U and D), then the whole population converges to action a, regardless of ↵ A . These observations are illustrated in Figure 2 , where U > D. 
Hence in equilibrium, a greater probability of sampling individuals of the same type makes it more likely for an individual to sample her optimal action. This allows a larger fraction of this type of individuals to choose their optimal action, as they are less exposed to the possibility of sampling an individual of the other type choosing the other action.
Finally, from the results above, the system cannot converge to (1, 0) when
The following remark, however, reveals that e p can be arbitrarily close to 1, even if
, provided that type A individuals are sufficiently homophilous. This result also implies that in the limit, as each type becomes completely homophilous, a heterogeneous population behaves as two homogenous populations.
A monopolist with heterogeneous consumers
In this section we consider a monopolist who serves a market of boundedly rational consumers with heterogeneous valuations for his product. We assume that the expected valuation of the product is positive for some consumers and zero for others. The two possible choices for consumers are buying or not buying the product.
The monopolist knows the expected value of the valuation and the size of each type. Furthermore, he knows that consumers are boundedly rational and their decision rules. The valuation of each individual consumer, however, is unknown to both the monopolist and the consumer.
Consumers' decisions. To fix ideas, suppose the population consists of individuals that suffer from a chronic illness that produces unpleasant symptoms. The monopolist provides the only available treatment.
Symptoms present themselves randomly and translate into physical payoffs, measured in monetary units, which take values within a finite set whose minimum is 0.5 and maximum is 1. 27 The outcomes 0.5 and 1 can be thought of as the physical payoff of "full symptoms" and "no symptoms," respectively. The expected physical heavily biased toward sampling individuals of their own type is not incompatible with uniform adoption. For instance, in Figure 2 , we just require ↵ B < 0.19 for uniform adoption of a to occur for any ↵ A . More broadly, if we measure type B individuals' bias to sample their own type by B := ↵ B (1 ↵) 1 , it is easy to see that we can have uniform adoption even if B is very high: if we fix B , for sufficiently small (1 ↵) one obtains that B (1 ↵) < 0.54 and hence, uniform adoption of a (for high enough ↵ A ). 27 We normalize the physical payoffs to be in [0.5, 1] so that the total payoff of each choice, corresponding to the physical payoffs minus the price charged by the monopolist, fall in [0, 1], as in the benchmark model.
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payoff of an untreated individual is < 1. The treatment of the monopolist is effective for type A individuals but has no effect on type B individuals. The expected physical payoff of a type A individual under treatment 
⇤ .
The demand curve. We assume that the monopolist fully understands how individuals make choices, although he does not know the type of each individual or the realizations of payoffs and comparison signals.
We also assume that the monopolist chooses a fixed price that maximizes his profit in the asymptotically stable 28 Our model is related to Spiegler's (2006) model of markets for "quacks." In his paper the treatment is ineffective for all individuals in the population, so he refers to the healer as a quack. In our model the healer is not a quack since the treatment works for some individuals, although it is ineffective for others. 29 At prices above ', under full information, both type A and type B individuals prefer not to buy the treatment. In our setting, such prices would lead the population to a state in which no individual buys the treatment. As we show below, prices larger than ' do not add anything to the analysis. 30 For example, suppose the illness is chronic overweight and the treatment is an individualized diet prescribed by a nutritionist. Whether the diet is effective for weight control may depend, among other things, on individuals' willpower. Such considerations may lead an individual to see the nutritionist even after hearing about the negative experience of an undisciplined acquaintance, if she believes herself to have more willpower than the acquaintance. 31 From footnote 12, we need 2 0, . 33 Otherwise, if the monopolist sets a price level r 2 (r(', ↵), r(', ↵)), then the asymptotically stable rest point will be interior and it will be given by
⌘ , wherep andq are the functions defined in Section 3.
Thus, the demand curve faced by the monopolist, Q : [0, 1) ! [0, 1], is given by
If the price is below a certain threshold the monopolist sells to the entire population. If it is above a certain threshold no one buys the treatment in the long run. At intermediate prices the monopolist captures a fraction of the population of both types. In this case, the demand curve is downward sloping and converges to 0 and 1 as the price goes to r(', ↵) and r(', ↵), respectively.
32 This simplifies the analysis significantly. We leave the alternative, in which the monopolist has a positive discount rate and maximizes the present value of all his future profits, for future research. 33 The statement of Theorem 1 does not include the cutoff values, which in this case correspond to r = r(', ↵) and r = r(', ↵), since the techniques used to prove Theorem 1 are valid for hyperbolic rest-points and some rest points are non-hyperbolic at the cutoff values. Nevertheless, by directly applying the definition of asymptotic stability and constructing a straightforward " argument, it can be shown that for the prices r = r(', ↵) and r = r(', ↵), (p ⇤ , q ⇤ ) is equal to (1, 0) and (0, 1), respectively.
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The monopolist optimal prices. We assume that the marginal costs of the monopolist are constant and equal to k 0. The profit of the monopolist as a function of the price, G : [0, 1) ! R, is, hence, given by
if r(', ↵) < r < r(', ↵) 0 if r r(', ↵).
The elasticity of the demand curve drops to zero at r = r(', ↵), price at which the monopolist would sell the treatment to the whole market. Furthermore, when marginal costs are low enough, the right derivative of the profit function with respect to the price is negative at r = r(', ↵) and, thus, as we show below, the monopolist chooses r = r(', ↵). On the other hand, when the marginal costs are higher, he charges a higher price and sells the treatment to only a fraction of the population. More precisely, we have the following relation between marginal costs and the change in profits at the price at which the monopolist sells to the whole population.
denote the right derivative of G for all x 2 (r(', ↵), r(', ↵)).
Lemma 4 There is a unique marginal costk
(r) is continuous and increasing in k for all r 2 (r(', ↵), r(', ↵)). Hence, there is a uniquek 2 (0, r(', ↵)) such that G 0 (r(', ↵)
The next result characterizes the optimal prices charged by the monopolist. The proof is provided in Appendix E. If the marginal cost is low enough, when k <k, the monopolist sets the highest price at which he sells to the whole population. At a higher price he loses both type A and type B clients. In this case, the reduction in sales outweighs the positive effect on profits of the higher price. If the marginal cost is sufficiently high, when k > r(', ↵), the monopolist chooses not to produce. In this case, marginal costs may well be below type A individuals' willingness to pay, which occurs if k 2 (r(', ↵), '). Here, at any price at which the monopolist earns positive profits by selling the treatment, it is unattractive for type B individuals and not sufficiently attractive for type A individuals to the point that buying the treatment does not survive in the long run. Wheneverk < r(', ↵) the optimal price is strictly increasing in both ↵ and '. With a larger ↵ the dynamics towards buying the treatment are stronger due to the sampling effects discussed before. With a larger ' type A individuals tend to choose treatment more often while the sensitivity of type B individuals' problem is unaffected. In both of these cases the monopolist loses fewer clients when raising the price and therefore charges a higher price in equilibrium. The formal arguments for these comparative statics appear in Appendix E.
Welfare analysis. Under full information, i.e., if the monopolist and individuals knew their type, the monopolist would set the price at ' and only type A individuals would buy the treatment. There would hence be no deadweight loss in a standard computation of consumer and producer surplus. Further, the monopolist would earn the entire surplus, equal to ↵(' k). When individuals are boundedly rational and the monopolist sets the price at r ⇤ , (i) there is always a deadweight loss (except in the cases k = 0 and k '),
(ii) the monopolist earns lower profits than under full information, and (iii) type A and type B individuals are weakly better off and weakly worse off, respectively, than under full information. The deadweight loss in our setup comes from two different sources. First, whenever the treatment is sold in the market (i.e., whenever k < r(', ↵)) the cost of providing type B individuals with treatment causes a deadweight loss. Second, whenever k 2 (k, ') a deadweight loss arises since some type A individuals do not buy treatment in spite of having a willingness to pay that exceeds the marginal cost.
The profits of the monopolist are smaller in our setup compared to the case of full information. Biased sampling. While for simplicity the results here are obtained under the assumption of uniform sampling, the analysis extends in a relatively straightforward manner to biased sampling (at the cost of slightly more involved derivations). Under biased sampling ↵ A (z) and ↵ B (z) define cutoff prices in an analogous way as above. The homophily of each type affects the cutoff prices in the obvious way. Demand depends positively on the homophily of type A and negatively on the homophily of type B and the monopolist's profit follows the same pattern. In the limit, when both types are perfectly homophilic, the monopolist sets some price very close to ' and sells only to the entire type A population. In other words, perfect homophily brings us back to the case of full information. 34 For the formal argument, see Remark 8 in Appendix E.
Discussion
In the benchmark model, we assume that individuals' assessments of their expected payoff relative to others are unbiased. Individuals often make systematic mistakes in assessments of relative abilities. 35 In Appendix We leave a thorough analysis for future research.
Our model assumes an exogenous sampling process. In the presence of heterogeneity, however, individuals may have incentives to search for individuals that are similar to them and hence more suitable to learn from.
At the same time, it seems that individuals would prefer to sample others who have made good choices (e.g.,
Offerman and Schotter 2009
). An analysis that considers an endogenous sampling process might provide interesting insights into the implications of heterogeneity in the search for suitable role models.
Our model is qualitatively consistent with several empirical aspects of the process of diffusion of innovations.
In particular, it yields S-shaped adoption curves as those found in the empirical evidence. Furthermore, our model is consistent with some features of the diffusion of hybrid corn in Kenya found by Suri (2011): less-thanfull final adoption, heterogeneities in returns to adoption, and equilibrium switching behavior. A quantitative analysis is beyond the scope of this paper and is left for future research.
Appendix A: Proof of Necessity in Proposition 1
We define the probability space (⌦,F,μ) with⌦ = X 2 ⇥ ,F = 2 X 2 ⇥ , and the probability measure induced by µ Lemma 5 Suppose L is payoff-ordering. Then,
for all different actions c, d
and types ⌧, ⌧ 0 2 T .
Proof. Consider the environment induced by µ
is analogous). We will now consider a different environment induced by a slightly different probability mass, e µ ⌧ c,⌧ 0 d . Suppose that payoffs and comparison-signals, in both environments, are independent. The modified version of µ ⌧ d , denoted by e µ ⌧ d , is such that for any set I ⇢ X \ {1} we have
The expected value, with the modified distribution, of the comparison signal of a type ⌧ individual who observes a type ⌧ 0 individual who chooses d, denoted by
where
d is the expected value of the comparison signal in the initial environment. Suppose that the distribution of this comparison signal in the modified environment is given by a compounded distribution which weights with probabilities 1 " and " the distribution of the comparison signal in the initial environment and a degenerate distribution which assigns all the probability to 1 ⇡ 
. In order to see this, notice that
where the right hand side is a polynomial function of ". Thus, for small enough ", e
and, since
Proof. Consider x, y, which satisfy the hypothesis and an environment in which Proof. Consider arbitrary x, y 2 [0, 1] and 2 [ 1, 1] . Consider an environment such that, with probability 1 2 , a first event occurs in which the payoff received by type ⌧ when she chooses c is x, the payoff received by type ⌧ 0 individual when she chooses d is y, and the comparison signal observed by a type ⌧ individual when she observes the type ⌧ 0 individual is . Otherwise, a second event occurs in which the payoff received by a type ⌧ individual when she chooses c is y, the payoff received by a type ⌧ 0 individual when she chooses d is x, and the comparison signal observed by a type ⌧ individual when she observes a type ⌧ 0 individual is . It
Now consider a second environment that differs from the previous one only in that the first event is replaced by two events that occur with probability , respectively. In the first of these events, 36 Notice that since the payoff-ordering property has to hold for arbitrary finite sets X ⇢ the payoff received by a type ⌧ individual when she chooses c is 0, the payoff received by a type ⌧ 0 individual when she chooses d is 1, and the comparison signal observed by a type ⌧ individual when she observes a type ⌧ 0 individual is 1. In the second of these events, the payoff received by a type ⌧ individual when she chooses c is 1, the payoff received by a type ⌧ 0 individual when she chooses d is 0, and the comparison signal observed by a type ⌧ individual when she observes a type ⌧ 0 individual is 1. As in the previous environment,
, i.e.,
( 1 3 ) Subtracting (12) from (13), we obtain
It follows that L is a linear function of y + x, and thus, from Corollary 2, L must satisfy L(x, y, ) = 
Appendix B: Formal derivation of the dynamic system
We first introduce the probability space and individual space.
Probability space. The population is modeled as an index probability space (W, W, ) where W is the continuum of individuals, W is a algebra of subsets of W , and is a super-atomless measure; in particular (A) = ↵ and (B) = 1 ↵. 37 Time is indexed by t 2 R + with the Borel algebra denoted by B. The probability space that we use to model the random aspects of the imitation process is (⌦, F, P ).
38
Dynamical system. Our analysis is concerned with the fraction of type A individuals choosing a, p(!, t), and the fraction of type B individuals choosing b, q(!, t) for all ! 2 ⌦ and t 2 R + . In order to analyze the paths (p(!, t), q(!, t)) t2R + , we define the state function ⇢ : W ⇥ ⌦ ⇥ R + ! ⌃ where ⇢(i, !, t) is the state of individual 37 For a definition of super-atomless measures see Definition 5 and the appendix of Podczeck (2010) . 38 The analysis also assumes a right-continuous filtration {F t : t 2 R + } in the probability space (⌦, F, P ), such that all null events are included in F 0 ; but this filtration will not appear (explicitly) in our analysis.
i in the state of the world !, at time t. We also define the sampling function ⇡ : W ⇥ ⌦ ⇥ R + ! W [ {J} specifying the individual ⇡(i, !, t) that the individual i samples at time t in the state of the world !, where ⇡(i, !, t) = J means that individual i does not sample any other individual at time t in the state of the world !. We assume that ⇡(i, !, t) 6 = J implies ⇡(⇡(i, !, t), !, t) = i; that is, individuals sample each other. The fraction of individuals whose state is at time t in the state of the world !, denoted by p (!, t), is given by p (!, t) = ({i 2 W : ⇢(i, !, t) = }) for all 2 ⌃, ! 2 ⌦, and t 2 R + . Therefore, we have the following versions of (2) and (3) that express directly the state of the world dependence of the fractions of individuals making optimal choices:
Differential equations of the system. We now provide the differential equations governing the fractions of the population making their optimal choices within each type.
Proposition 4
Fix the initial fractions of the population in each individual state at (p (0)) 2⌃ 2ˆ (⌃).
There exists a Fubini Extension
in which the state and sampling function (⇢, ⇡)
are defined, such that: (i) (p(!, t), q(!, t)) is deterministic almost surely; and (ii) for P almost all ! 2 ⌦,
is the solution of the system of differential equations
40
Before providing the proof of Proposition 4 we need to introduce the following definition, which is adapted from Duffie, Qiao and Sun (2016). (2010) shows that a sufficient condition allowing ⇥ P to be a rich Fubini extension (i.e., a proper extension of the product measure of and P on W ⇥ ⌦ that allows for essentially pairwise independent random variables that are not essentially constant), is that the measure in the index probability space ( ) is super-atomless, which we have assumed from the outset. 40 As in most of the equations below, the time and state-of-the-world dependence of p and q have been omitted. 
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for all two different states and 00 in ⌃, and R (!, t) = P 0 2⌃\{ } R 0 (!, t) for all 2 ⌃, ! 2 ⌦, and such that the pair of state and sampling function (⇢, ⇡), defined on (W ⇥ ⌦, W ⇥ F, ⇥ P ), is a DS with
42
From their Corollary 1, for P almost all !, (p (!, t)) 2⌃ is the solution of the system of differential equationṡ
for all 2 ⌃, with (p (!, 0)) 2⌃ = (p (0)) 2⌃ . Therefore, In the definition in Duffie, Qiao and Sun (2016), dynamical systems also depend on parameters describing mutation intensities and matching intensities. In our model there are no mutations so these parameters are all zero and hence we omit them, and the matching intensities of our model are given by the fraction of the population of the state of the individual to be sampled; thus we omit these parameters as well. We only consider different intensities in Section 4 and Appendix D.
42 Corollary 2 in Duffie, Qiao and Sun (2016) considers a slightly more general formulation of Definiton 2 (that, as mentioned in footnote 41, allows for exogenous mutation rates of individual states and matching intensities functions where matching intensities of individuals of different states are not necessarily proportional to the fraction of the population of the individual state of the sampled individual). For that more general formulation, this corollary establishes the existence of a Fubini Extension where a DS (⇢, ⇡) can be defined. Their Corollary 1, which we use below, provides the differential equations describing the path of the expected value of the fraction of individuals in each individual state and establishes that the realization of this path is almost surely equal to its expected value. 43 In the rest of the proof we omit the time and state-of-the-world dependence of p , p, and q, and their time derivatives.
subtrahend, the second summation is over { 
. (21) The minuend in the right-hand-side of (21) 
Therefore,
where the second equality follows from the fact that 1.
for all x 0 2 X and 2 .
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Similarly, the subtrahend of (21) can be written as
The analogous argument yields (17).
9 Appendix C: Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. First we establish asymptotic stability. Define the Jacobian matrix of (ṗ,q) holds observe that, from (19), we have P 2⌃:⌧ =A,c=a,x=x0ṗ
is equal to P 2⌃:⌧ =A,c=a,x=x0
, the minuend is µ Aa (x 0 ) times the minuend in (20) . The initial conditions imply that, at time t = 0, the subtrahend is µ Aa (x 0 ) times the subtrahend in (20) . Thus, at t = 0, P 2⌃:⌧ =A,c=a,x=x0ṗ = µ Aa (x 0 )↵ṗ. Therefore, at t = 0, the right derivative of P 2⌃:⌧ =A,c=a,x=x0 p /(↵p) with respect to t is 0. Furthermore, the derivative of P 2⌃:⌧ =A,c=a,x=x0 p /(↵p) with respect to t is negative (positive) when P 2⌃:⌧ =A,c=a,x=x0 p > (<)µ Aa (x 0 ). Thus, P 2⌃:⌧ =A,c=a,x=x0 p /(↵p) is constant over time and equal to its value at t = 0, µ Aa (x 0 ). The proof of the facts 2.-4. is similar and it is omitted.
An analogous calculation holds for (0, 1). Now, consider (p,q). Note that
(U +D 1) = ↵. In order to prove that the asymptotically stable points are global attractors, notice thatṗ 2 ,q 1 < 0, hence 10 Appendix D: Proofs Section 4
Dynamical systems with biased sampling
In this subsection we briefly sketch how to derive (10)- (11) . The general version of equation (18), when we allow for general intensities, is
and the corresponding version of equation (19) is
Then, (22) and analogous derivations to those following equation (19) in Appendix B yield (10)-(11).
Proofs of Stable equilibria
First we provide the proof of Lemma 2. 
. An analogous argument proves (ii).
Now we provide the results that lead to the proof of Lemma 3. Define 
Remark 4 (i) ↵
. Analogous calculations hold for (ii).
In the sequel, unless stated otherwise, the domains of p and q are the whole set of real numbers. The following results follow from straightforward calculus:
Remark 5 q(p(q)) q = 0 is a polynomial equation of degree 4, and consequently has at most 4 different solutions in q 2 R.
Remark 6 q(p) has the following properties: (i) q(0) = 1 and
. In particular lim
) + q(p) = 1 and (iv) q has two local extrema, a local maximum at some p < 1 and a local minimum at some p > U/(2U 1).
The following Lemma shows that one of the four roots of q(p(q)) q = 0 is located outside of [0, 1], which implies that if there is an interior rest point it is unique.
Proof. (i) Consider the case 
) is in the subgraph of q(p). Next, given that
there is some 
there is some q 00 2 (0, 1) (sufficiently small)
) and q 00 '
(1 ↵ B )(1 2D) ) is in the epigraph of q, there must be a point (p(z), z), with z 2 ( 1, 0), that is both in the subgraph and in the epigraph of q. Hence q(p(z)) = z for some
. Now we provide the proof of Lemma 3.
Proof. (of Lemma 3) (i) Suppose
] and p are continuous on ( 1, 0).
. This means that there is some sufficiently large q 00 such that p(q The expression for e q is analogous.
Proof. The terms p and 1 p can be factored out from the left hand side of the fourth degree polynomial p(q(p)) p = 0. It is thus obtained that any interior rest point must be a solution to the second degree polynomial Hence, the system converges to (e p, e q). 
Proofs for comparative statics of Section 4

Analogous arguments yield (i) and (ii).
We now provide the proof of Remark 3. , which approaches 1 as ↵ A ! 1. Since e p(↵ A , ↵ B ) > p 0 , we obtain that lim where the sign of the derivative follows since the denominator is negative and the numerator can be shown to be positive in all three cases. Hence, whenever k < r(', ↵), r ⇤ is strictly increasing in k, ↵ and '.
Finally, the following remark shows that the monopolist's profits in this setup are smaller than under full information. 
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We now consider how the predictions of the model respond to changes in "
A and " B . For concreteness we focus on "
A . First, ↵ " 1 (" A , " B ), ↵ " 1 (" A , " B ) > 0. This means that, as type A individuals' bias increases, the system converges to (0, 1) for a larger set of parameter configurations and to (1, 0) for a smaller set of parameters. Next, we obtain that
Hence, the outcome becomes worse for type A individuals as their bias increases. On the other hand q 1 (" A , " B ) > 0, i.e., type B individuals benefit from type A individuals' bias. If we take as a starting point " A = " B = 0, these results imply that type A individuals are affected negatively by their bias, while type B individuals benefit from this. On the other hand, type A individuals obtain a better outcome when their bias decrease, while type B individuals are negatively affected by this.
There is a simple intuition behind these results. As we see in equations (23)- (24), the effect of the bias onṗ depends on p and q. If the biases are positive, there is a positive effect for small values of p and q (more precisely, below the line q = 1 p) and a negative effect for large values. The isoclines in the phase diagrams are always above the line q = 1 p, however. Intuitively, when q is large, it is difficult to find a type B individual choosing a. At the same time, when p is large, there is only a small fraction of type A individuals choosing b and who are therefore candidates to switch to action a. Hence, switching towards action a in A is small, and the positive effect of the bias on this switching is, therefore, relatively unimportant. In contrast, there are many type A individuals choosing a that observe type B individuals choosing b, and hence the effect of the bias on these switches is larger. The result is that a positive bias causes a net increase in switching towards b among type A individuals, which in the end makes A worse off. The opposite occurs when type A individuals have negative biases. A negative bias reduces switching, and at large values of p and q this inhibits switching away from a to a greater extent than it inhibits switching away from b. This leads to a larger fraction of type A individuals choosing their optimal action in the long run. By the same logic as in the benchmark model, whatever causes a stronger motion towards a among type A individuals has a negative effect on type B individuals. Hence, when type A individuals have negative biases and obtain a better outcome, type B individuals are worse off. Analogously, when type A individuals have positive biases and obtain a worse outcome, this benefits type B individuals.
